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TAMPERING WITH WITNESSES AND JURORS
That a party to a litigation has resorted to illegitimate
means to produce in his favor or prevent the production to
his detriment, of evidence, or to affect the decision of
jurors, is deemed a relevant fact.
Party Must Be Connected With the Improper Act
An attempt to corrupt a juror, or a witness, must be
shown to have been made by the party, or with his knowl-
edge and approval. Unless he is connected with it, it can
have no relevancy. In an issue to determine the genuine-
ness of a single bill upon which judgment had been en-
tered, a witness for the defendant testified that Dr.
Elliott (not a party) had threatened to prosecute him if
he testified for the defendant. As it did not appear that
Dr. Elliott was in any way connected with the plaintiff,
so as to make the latter responsible for his act, it was
error to admit the evidence.
2
Husband and Wife
The suppression or manufacture of evidence, should
affect adversely only the person who effects it, directly,
Com. v. Brown, 23 Super. 470; Trlpner v. Abrahams, 47 Pe. 220.
2Thomas v. Miller, 151 P& 482.
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or through others. One is not responsible for acts done
by others in his interest, without his knowledge or pro-
curement. Hence, a wife should not be prejudiced by the
improper acts of her husband, she not be-
ing shown to be an accomplice therein, or
to have knowledge of them. In an action of
ejectment by A against B and her husband, proof was ad-
mitted that the husband gave a witness money during a
former trial. No evidence was given of B's participation
in the act. Says Thompson, J., reversing the judgment
for the plaintiff: "Before the act of one shall affect anoth-
er, so as to involve him in imputed crime, combination to
do the act, or at least a step in it, must be shown. That
was not done here, excepting only so far as the relation of
husband and wife existed. But it would be a harsh rule
to impute to the wife the crimes of the husband, simply as
a result of the existing relation. As affecting the wife, the
evidence was improperly admitted. Restricted so as to
affect the husband's interest alone, if that were possible,
it would be properly admitted-' In a contest over a will
alleged to be invalid because of the "delusional insanity"
of the testatrix, the husband of the sole beneficiary and
the executor of the will, was shown by a physician, a wit-
ness for the contestant, to have offered him a share of the
estate if he would help win the case. The physician re-
plied that he would tell the truth. The proponent offered
no testimony in denial of the charge. The will was never-
theless found to be valid. Penrose, J., remarking that
the physician did not state what he was asked to do, and
that while such conduct induced suspicion and close scrut-
iny, it could not overcome the facts established by the un-
disputed testimony.4
81Tripner v. Abrahams, 47 Pa. 220. Efforts of a wife of heir,
to induce a witness to testify that the deceased was incompetent to
make a will, properly excluded unless in the presence of the husband
or as his agent. Deitrich v. Deitrich, 1 P. and W. 306.
4Jacobs' Estate, 17 Dist. 369.
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Improper Conduct of Administrator
If the suit is brought by or against one who is ex-
ecutor or administrator, or trustee, the interests repre-
sented by him may be affected by his improper conduct.
In a scire facias to revive a judgment against X, now dead,
his widow and adninistratrix, as defendant, alleged and
attempted to prove accord and satisfaction or payment of
the judgment. It was proper to allow proof by the plain-
tiff that she had attempted to suborn witnesses and to cor-
rupt jurors. Fell, J., observes that she was, as a benefi-
ciary under her husband's will, largely interested in the
litigation, adding, "But the effect of her conduct was the
same whether she was acting for herself or for another,"
and quoting Lush, J., in Moriarity v. L. C. and D. Ry. Co.
L. R. 5 Q. B. Cases 314. "I also think no distinction can
be made with reference to the character of the party su-
ing, whether it is a representative character, or he is suing
to enforce some right of his own. Either way, the infer-
ence which the evidence tends to raise is the same, that the
case is not a true one, and on that ground the evidence is
receivable." 5
Point in Litigation When Improper Conduct May Have
Occurred
The improper conduct of a party which tends to dis-
credit his cause may have occurred with respect to the
trial, at which proof of it is offered in order to affect the
decision. But this is not necessary. There may have
been an earlier trial, and the attempt may have been to
corrupt the jurors or the witnesses thereat. Such attempt
may be shown at a later trial of the same cause, to have
been made. There had been6 a former trial of a scire fa-
cias quare executionem non. The defendant had prior
5 cHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
GMcHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
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thereto, attempted to procure false testimony and corrupt-
ly influence the jurors. Proof of this was properly ad-
mitted at the last trial. In a second ejectment between
the same parties, evidence of an effort by one of the two
defendants, (husband and wife), to corrupt a witness at
the earlier trial, was held receivable to affect the party,
(the husband) who employed the improper means to se-
cure a verdict.7 The principle seems to be that, if at any
stage, however early, a party shows distrust of his cause,
by employing illegitimate means to win success, his future
abstinence from the use of such means will not remove
the suspicion and discredit which his prior conduct may
have created. Was this principle involved, in Bryant v.
Stillwell?8 The suit was by carpenters for the price of
the erection of a tavern house. The defendant alleged ser.
ious departures from the plans and specifications. The
plaintiff requested X to examine the building, so as to
qualify himself to testify. He called, a week before the
trial but was refused permission by the defendant to go
through the house. Proof of these facts on behalf of the
plaintiff was received at the trial.. Black, J., approving,
remarks that "To smother evidence is not much better
than to fabricate it. A party who shuts the door upon
a fair examination, and thus prevents the jury from learn-
ing a material fact, must -take the consequence of any hon-
est indignation which his conduct may excite."He adds,
however, that "such evidence must be confined strictly to
the conduct of the party in and about the very cause in
which it is used. It must not only relate to the same sub-
ject but to the same investigation of it * * * * If there-
fore, the defendant should not refuse an examination for
the purpose of the next trial, he cannot be prejudiced by
what he did before the last one. It is true also, that the
strength of such a presumption diminishes (i. e., the pre-
^Tripuer v. Abrahms, 47 Pa. 220.
'24 Pa. 314.
Dickinson Law Reviw
sumption that he witholds the truth because he knows it
will make against him) in very rapid proportion to the
time that elapses between the act out of which it rises, and
the judicial inquiry which the act was intended to in-
fluence." But why? When the improper suppression
occurred, it manifested a want of confidence in the sound-
ness of the case. Does subsequent abstention from such
suppression show an absence of this want of confidence,
and if it does, does the fact that the want of confidence
has not been constant, destroy its probative value?
Kits of Cornipt Pratice
Of the kinds of corrupt pactice which tend to dis-
credit causes, various specimens are to be found in the
reports. In an action of dower against a woman claim-
ing to be wife by a second marriage, the first not having
been dissolved by death or divorce, the plaintiff's proof
was properly received that defendant had requested X un-
der promise of pay, to supply with whiskey, a witness who
had testified before an auditor in behalf of plaintiff in or-
der to induce him to contradict his testimony, and that
this witness was supplied with whiskey and kept drunk.9
An attempt by the defendant to suborn one of the plain-
tiff's witnesses, in ejectment.1° Defendant in scire facias
sur judgment, attempting to prove accord and satisfac-
tion, called on X and asked him what he knew of the case.
X replied, "nothing." Defendant replied, "I am going to
subpoena you as a witness." X replied, "You had bet-
ter not, because I can do you no good." Defendant said,
"If you will come up and swear in my favor, I will see
that your son John gets the plumbing in the new brew-
ery." To another person, Y, defendant said that if he
would help her out in the case (an earlier trial) she would
get him a job in the brewery. Y became a wit-
Heslaop v. Hes4op, 82 Pa. 637.28Nwez .Groga, 2=2 P. 887.
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ness, and was subsequently employed on the
brewery. To another person, Z, defendant said,
"You are well acquainted over the county, you
can get the names of the jurors, and go around and fix
them up; four or five hundred dollars would fix any jury.
1 will give you plenty of money." To another, R, the de-
fendant said, "They are trying to rob me about the notes
Richard (her former husband, now deceased) gave to
Mary. Now R. you heard Richard say to Mary, you
know I don't owe you anything, Mary,' and Mary said
to Richard 'I know it, but I will keep the notes.'" De-
fendant said to R., "Now R, try and remember that and
you will lose nothing by it."' "1 Money was paid to a wit-
ness by the proponent of a will, the chief beneficiary
therein, to secure his proof of the will. 1 - The chief bene-
ficiary in a will, asks the subscribing witness, during
or before a contest thereover, to become counsel for the
estate after the contest is determined. 3  Threats and
promises, to witness for the prosecution and the institu-
tion of a prosecution for adultery or perjury, against a
commonwealth's witness were employed in a prosecution
for perjury.4
Using False Testinony Without Inducing It
The difference between the -turpitude of using ev-
idence known to be false, which is spontaneously
tendered by the witness, and that of brib-
ing or coercing him to furnish it, and then using
it, is not serious. Hence the same discredit would pro-
"lMcHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
l2Brady v. McEnroe, 10 Dist. 115. The evidence was procur-
ed from the witness on his cross examination, probably to discredit
his testimony.
13Id. Not clear whether the evidence was to discredit the wit-
ness, or to show a consciousness of the proponent that -his cause was
ba&
14 (over v. Com, 5 Sadler 79.
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bably rest on a cause which was supported by testimony
known by the party using it to be false whether the wit-
ness was persuaded to give it or not. The defendant in a
burglary prosecution, called witnesses who testified to an
alibi. The court remarked to the jury that "if they found
that the evidence of the alibi was false, and manufactur-
ed by the defense, it should go for nothing, and should
have some weight against the defendant."'1 The effect
must have been the same, if the testimony was false,
whether "manufactured" by the defendant or not.
Conspiracy To Fabricate Evidence
That a party to a suit has comspired with another
to fabricate evidence, may be shown to discredit his cause.
It cannot however be shown by the record of their convic-
tion of the conspiracy. 16 Attempting, though unsuccessful-
ly, to fabricate evidence, by suborning witnesses, or to cor-
rupt a jury, will discredit the cause of the guilty party.' 7
Destroying Evidence
There may be writings or other physical objects that
would furnish evidence against a party. Taking steps to
prevent the use of these by the opposite party, may dis-
credit the cause of the party who thus prevents their use.
In a persecution for murder, the defendant, who had writ-
ten a letter to a friend in Illinois, which contained in-
criminatory statements, asked a friend to write to this Illi-
nois person, requesting him to return the letter. These
facts may be shown by the prosecution, by the testimony
of the person who wrote the letter to the Illinois party. 8
"iCom. v. McMahon, 145 Pa. 413.
'6Wingrove v. Central Pa. Traction Co., 237 Pa. 549.
"TCom. v. Brown, 23 Super., 470, 502; MeHugh v. McHugh, 186
Pa. 197
n8Com. v. Marion. 232 Pa. 413.
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Corupting Jurors
The attempt improperly to influence a juror, as
strongly reveals a sense of the badness of one's cause, as
does the attempt to induce a witness to give or withhold
testimony. Hence it may be shown that the party endeav-
ored to employ a man to offer bribes to jurors, in an
earlier trial of the same cause.21  The case in which this
embracery may be shown, may be either civil 2 or crim-
inal.2" Rice, P. J., comparing embracery with the flight
of an accused person, remarks that "such conduct on the
part of the accused, or instigated by him, gives rise to a
stronger inference than flight. '22 He adds that it "stands
on the same plane with the fabrication of evidence in his
defense, or the destruction of evidence to prove his guilt,
and with an attempt to corrupt the commonwealth's wit-
nesses."' 2'
Use In Criminal Cases
A majority of the cases in which evidence of improper
attempts to influence the testimony of witnesses,
or to corrupt jurors has been given are civil.24
They may however be shown equally well in criminal pros-
ecutions; e. g. in a prosecution of school directors for con-
spiracy to extort money from applicants for the position
:'McHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197; Com. v. Brown, 23 Super.
470, 502.
20186 Pa. 197.
2123 Super. 470, 502.
22AS to flight, see Penna. Crim. Law, 1056.
23Judge Rice cites Cathcart v. Com., 37 Pa. 108; and McMeen
v Corn., 114 Pa. 300, 307, where however the doctrine is that the fact
that a person on trial for a crime, has previously thereto made false
and contradictory statements concerning it, for the sake of divert-
ing inquiry, and casting off suspicion, may be proved, as tending to
show a consciousness of guilt.
2 4M.Hugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
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of school teachers.2 In a prosecution for perjury the com-
monwealth proved that the defendant had, before the trial,
approached witnesses subpoenaed by the commonwealth,
and by means of threats, and promises, and, in one in-
stance, by beginning a prosecution for bigamy or adultery,
had endeavored to deter them from testifying.8 In a bur-
glary case the defendant secured false testimony as to an
alibi.2 7 In a prosecution for murder, an attempt of the
defendant to procure the return to him by a friend to
whom he had written it of a letter containing compromis-
ing statements, was proved.28
Use By Prosecution
The commonwealth's officer may doubtless use im-
proper means to secure evidence, the proof of which
would justify suspicion of the prosecution. So in a prose-
cution for seduction under a promise of marriage wherein
the commonwealth relied on an alleged admission by the
defendant that he had promised marriage, an admission
made in the presence of the girl, her father and mother.
Paxson, J. says the neglect by the commonwealth to call
the father of the girl, who was present at the interview,
and heard all that was said, "would have justified the
jury in drawing an inference seriously unfavorable to
the prosecution, and the court below would have been at
least justified in saying so." 9
Reasons For Admittirg Evidence of Corrupt Aits
In explaining the relevancy of evidence of fabrication
or suppression of testimony, or corruption of a juror, Fell,
J. observes "The conduct of the party may then be attribu-
2 Com. v. Brown, 23 Super. 470. Improperly influenting a juror,
26Cover v. Com., 5 Sadler 79.
27Com. v. McMlaon, 145 Pa. 413.
28Com. v. Marion, 232 Pa. 413.
29Rice v. Com., 102 Pa. 408.
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ted to his knowledge that his cause was an unjust one,"
and he quotes from Best on Evidence, "If it be shown that
a plaintiff has been suborning false testimony, and has
endeavored to have recourse to perjury, it is strong evi-
dence that he knew perfectly well that his cause was an
unrighteous one."30  "Strong evidence" it plainly is not.
A timid man, conscious of innocence of a crime, may nev-
ertheless fear that he will nQt be able to convince a jury
of it. Circumstances may justify others in believing him
guilty. False or mistaken witnesses may be ready to tes-
tify against him. His object, in influencing a witness,
may be to neutralize influences that have already wrong-
ly determined the latter to give hostile testimony. An
alternative explanation is also suggested by Fell, J., in the
case cited. He says evidence of the misconduct of a party
in connection with the trial is admissible, as tending to
show that "he is unwilling to rely on the truth of his cause,
or is conscious that it is an unjust one." A man may
be unwilling to rely on truthful testimony, although he
is conscious that his cause is a just one.
How Prove the Tampering With Witnesses
Persons who know of the acts of subornation or of
attempted subornation of witnesses, may prove them. The
testimony of the plaintiff's former counsel concerning the
attempt to manufacture testimony and to bribe witnesses,
will not be excluded on the ground that what the plaintiff
and his witnesses told the counsel was a privileged com-
munication from client to attorney.3 ' A claimant of a
share of the estate of a deceased married woman, as a
child of such person, may admit on cross examination that
he had fabricated evidence in support of his claim, while
endeavoring to raise money on it and thus discredit his
ZOMcHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197; Dundas' Estate, 213 Pa. 628,
636.
31Kiritis v. Ry., 1 Northumb. 67.
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claim.32 The witness, who testifies in support of a will,
may be cross examined, as to whether he had not been
paid money to come to Philadelphia, and prove the will.
The subscribing witnesses may be asked whether the chief
beneficiary in the will, had not tried, before or during the
contest, to employ them to become counsel after the con-
test was ended, for the estate.3 That a party has con-
spired with another to furnish false evidence, cannot be
proved by the record of a conviction of such conspiracy.34
The Weight of the Evidence
If the evidence without which a plaintiff or a defend-
ant must lose is proved, to the satisfaction of the jury, to
be false, whether suborned or not, the plaintiff or defend-
ant will of course lose. If improper influences are shown
to have been exerted on the witness, by the party
in whose favor he testifies, the jury will have reason to
suspect that the testimony has been colored by the wit-
ness, in compliance with the wish of the party. If the
party is shown to have attempted to bribe A, but A is not
produced as a witness, will the jury be justified in suspect-
ing the testimony of B, or C, or D, who have become wit-
nesses, but upon whom there is no evidence of the use of
improper influence? It doubtless will be so justified. B,
C, and D are thus indirectly impeached. Says Fell, J.,
"The effect of such testimony may be to impeach wit-
nesses by proof of misconduct with which they have had
no connection ;" but he adds, "the testimony of a witness
is never exempt from scrutiny." He observes "The cause
may be discredited, while the witness is not, for an entire-
ly honest, piece of testimony may be part of a dishonest
'^Dundas' Estate, 213 Pa. 636. Claimant alleged that he was an
illegitimate son of his mother, born in wedlock, and entitled to share
with the two legitimate children, the estate of his mother.
33Brady v. McEnroe, 10. Dist. 115.
34Wingrove v. Central Pa. Traction Co., 237 Fa 549.
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claim or defense." 33 That is true, but it is likewise true
that the believed truth of the testimony of B, or C, or D,
would compel a verdict for the party calling him, and the
suspicion awakened by the evidence of the party's improp-
er iifluence on A may induce the disbelief of B's, or C's,
or D's testimony notwithstanding its truth.
Weight of Evidence, Continued
Occasionally the courts remark that evidence of subor-
nation of witnesses, etc., justifies a presumption against
the guilty party. Thus, Fell, J., observes "The spoliation
of paper and the destruction or withholding of evidence
which a party ought to produce, gives rise to a presump-
tion unfavorable to him * * * A like presumption arises
where, in connection with the trial, testimony has been fab-
ricated, or witnesses suborned or a jury corruptly influen-
ced, or where an attempt has been made to do any of these
things."' 6 The trial court told the jury that, a party,
claiming under a transfer of personal property from X,
having failed, in a contest as to the bona fides of the trans.
fer, as respects X's creditors, to call X "the presumption is
that he would not have supported the evidence of the trans-
action, as claimed by" the transferee,! Thompson, C. J.
remarks "Where withholding testimony raises a violent
presumption that a fact not clearly proved or disproved
exists it is not error to allude to the fact of withholdng
as a circumstance strengthening the proof" (of the oppo-
site party).38 The word presumption is ambigious. In
connection with the subject before us, it means, says Rice,
P. J., "an inference of fact, not a presumption of law,"'
3
and an inference the making of which is not imposed on
-McHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
26McHigh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197.
WTHall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. 152.
38Frick v. Barbour, 64 Pa. 120.
3DWills v. Hardcastle, 19 Stiper. 525T Ginder v. Backman, 8
Super. 405. Non-production of perftient-evidenee.
Dickinson Law Review
the jury, but simply permitted to it. The court must say
nothing "to bind the jury, or to preclude them from de-
ciding the case for themselves on the evidence."
The fabrication of evidence, says Penrose, J., "while
it does not raise a presumption of law, justifies a finding
against the guilty party."40  Although Thompson, C. J.
speaks of the non-production of receipts, in a controversy as
to whether the parties to whom the receipts had been given,
were partners or not, as raising a "violent presumption"
that they would have shown that these parties suffered
themselves therein to be termed partners, he says "it is not
error (in the trial court) to allude to the fact of withhold-
ing as a circumstance strengthening the proof.""' In sus-
taining the instruction of the trial court, with respect to
the non-production of a witness, Thompson, J., notes that
"no binding instruction was predicated upon it.42 An
accident to a child from the falling on it of an unfastened
screen, being the subject of litigation, the trial court adver-
ted to the fact that several employes of the defendant who
saw the accident, were not called by him. Says Mitchell,
J., "The reasons why certain evidence, which might natur-
ally be looked for may not be produced, are so many and
so various, and sometimes so difficult of explanation that,
obviously, this is a kind of argument that requires careful
handling, especially when used from the bench. But it is
a legitimate instrument in the investigation of truth, and a
liberal discretion in its use must be allowed to the trial judge
who is in a far better position to determine the occasion
for it than this (the Supreme) Court possibly can-be. The
learned judge in his charge, alluding apparently to an ar-
gument (for the defendant) that the child had not been
injured as claimed, that in fact there had been no acci-
40Dundas' Estate, 213 Pa. 628; Wieder v. Miller, 52 Super. 198;
There is no legal presumption. The court must not give binding
instructions adverse to the party for omitting to furnish evidence in
his power. Hartman v. Incline Plane Co., 11 Super. 438.
4'Frick v. Barbour, 64 Pa. 120.
42Steininger v. Hoch, 42 Pa. 432.
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dent at that time, and place, reminded the jury of the pres-
ence of several employes of the defendant at the scene of
the alleged accident, and that none of them had been pro-
duced to disprove the fact. We cannot say that this was
exceeding the proper privilege of a judge, in comment-
ing on the unexplained absence of evidence, which ought
naturally to be 'n the case.' ' 43 The evidence furnished by
a party may be such as to justify a decision in his
favor, notwithstanding that he is shown to have attempt-
ed improperly to induce a witness to testify for him. In
an issue concerning testamentary competency, the husband
of the proponent, the sole beneficiary in the will, was shown
to have offered a physician a share of the estate, if he
would help win the case. Penrose, J. decided that such
conduct induced suspicion and close scrutiny, but could not
overcome the facts established by the undisputed testi-
mony.41 In Com. v. McMahon, 45 the defendant, indicted
for burglary, was shown to have fabricated evidence of an
alibi. The court said that such manufactured evidence
should go for nothing, and have "some weight against the
defendant."
The Omission To Call Witness or Exhibit Practicable
Evidence
When witnesses capable of testifying to a ;matter are
not called by a party in a litigation involving this matter,
there are several explanations possible. He may not have
known that the witness had the necessary knowledge. He
may have been too inert and neglectful, he may have sus-
pected the honesty of the witness, he may have believed
fully in the honesty of the witness, and for that reason,
assumed that his testimony would be adverse. The wit-
ness may have been sick or distant, or averse to appearing
43Collins v. Leafey, 23 W. N. 264.
"4Jacobs' Estate, 17 Dist 369.
45145 Pa. 413.
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in court on account of timidity. The party may explain
his failure to call the witness, consistently with his belief
that if called the testimony of the witness would not be
unfavorable .4 If no credible explanation is given, the
jury may infer, counsel in argument, the court in its com-
ment on the case, in its charge, may suggest the propriety
of the inference, that the reason for not calling the wit-
ness was the belief that his testimony would have been, if
truthful, adverse. This principle has had a variety of ap-
plications in the reported cases. In an action for breach
of promise of marriage, the defense was that the defendant
was a minor when he made the promise. The date of his
birth became material. His mother was not called by him.
His father was called. The court in its charge, observed
on the omission to call the mother. The verdict was for
the plaintiff. Rice, P. J. observes, justifying the action
of the court below, "where evidence that would properly be
a part of the case is within the control of the party whose
interest it would naturally be to produce it, and without
satisfactory explanation, he fails to do so, the jury may
draw an inference that it would be unfavorable to him.
47
A similar use was made of the omission to call a witness,
in the following cases. Sheriff's interpleader contest be-
tween a creditor of X, and A, who claims the property un-
der a transfer from X her father, prior to the execution.
A fails to call him to support the transfer.48  Suit on a
promissory note, executed by two persons. One of them
4-Ginder v. Bachman, 8 Super. 405; Hall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa.
152. In an action for personal injuries, caused by depressions in a
street, plaintiff called witnesses to prove the size, depth, etc., of these
depressions. It later appeared that plaintiff had had them meas-
ured by a surveyor. This did not justify the striking out of the
evidence of the witnesses, but warranted an unfa.o:able inference,
unless the plaintiff's explanation, that the surveyor's measurements
had been made seven days after the accident, and after changes had
been made in the street was believed. Harvey v. Chester, 211 Pa.
563.
47Ginder v. Bachnan, 8 Super. 405.
48Hall v. Vanderpool, 166 Pa. 152.
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sued, did not call the other as a witness. The court calls
the attention of the jury to this fact, saying the promissor
not called, must have known whether he sent the defend-
ant for the money, whether he got the money, whether the
defendant was present when the other signed the note, and
other facts, and allows the jury to take into considera-
tion the failure to call this person in determining the
credit they would give to the witnesses.49 Action for per-
sonal injuries to a child from the fall on it of a screen. De-
fendant argued that the alleged accident had not happened.
The defendant failed to call any of his employes who were
present at the time and place. The trial court properly
directed the jury's attention to that circumstance.50 The
defendant testified to a certain conversation between her-
self and one of the two plaintiffs, who were partners, the
other partner being present. One of the two partners con-
tradicts her. The other partner was not called. The fail-
ure of the plaintiff to corroborate the partner who testi-
fied by the testimony of the other, was properly referred
to by the trial court, as justifying belief of the defendant's
testimony.' Action on life policy. If the deceased had
had angina pectoris before applying for the insurance,
theie could be no recovery. Proof )f death was rhade
by a Dr. Leone who said therein, that he had attended the
insured for angina pectoris four years before the issue of
the policy. Dr. Leone was not called by the defendant.
There had been a former trial whereat the correctness of
Dr. Leone's statement had been denied by the plaintiff's
witnesses. His testimony at the last trial would have
been very important, if in accordance with his statement in
the proof of death.2 The improper construction of a wall
by an Incline Plane Company had caused injury by damp-
ness to an adjacent house. An action had been brought,
49Steininger v. Hoch's Exec., 42 Pa. 432.
50Collins v. Leafey, 23 W. N. 264.
'Wieder v. Miller, 52 Super. 198.
2Bondinella v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 Super. 293.
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resulting in recovery by the plaintiff. The injury continu-
ing, a second action was brought, with a similar result.
The injury still continuing, a third action was brought.
The defendant offered no evidence that it had modified
the wall. The trial court committed no error in allowing the
jury to infer, from the absence of evidence by the defend-
ant, that it had made no effort to remedy the improper
construction of the wall. Rice, P. J. observes "The non-
production of pertinent evidence, which, if it exists, is
peculiarly within the control of the parties, whose interest
it would be to produce it, is, of itself, often a circumstance
of greater or less weight which a jury may take into con-
sideration, and it is not reversible error for the trial judge
to call their attention to it, provided he does it fairly, and
without giving binding instructions as to the effect of the
omission.,,'
Omission to Give Evidence Continued
The refusal of a plaintiff claiming as endorsee in a
suit on a negotiable note, to be present at the trial, when
he knew that his identity with a person who was present
when the note was made, and who probably knew of the
fraud practiced on the maker of the note, the defendant,
was remarked on by the trial court, as lending ground for
inferring his identity, although the court thought and told
the jury that the weight of evidence was that he was not
in the county where .the note was made, when it was made.
The case had been continued several times, in order to give
the plaintiff, a resident of the state of New York, oppor-
tunity to be present. The plaintiff (who was a lawyer)
explained his absence by the advice of his counsel, who
did not think the evidence that would be used against
him legal. It had however been admitted by the court in
another case. He was engaged in business; it would have
been a loss to him to come to the trial. His attorney told
3Hartman v. Incline Plane Co., 11 Super. 438."
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him it was not necessary for him to come. The trial judge
said to the jui; "Mr. Brown, (the plaintiff), is himself a
lawyer, as appears by the evidence, and therefore capable
of deciding on the advice given him by his attorney. He
had a right to follow that advice. It may be a matter
for regret that he has not appeared here, as, had he seen
proper to come and testify, the question of identity would
in all probability have been satisfactorily settled." Ap-
proving the judgment for the defendant, Agnew, J. re-
marks "A man of ordinary intelligence must know that his
failing to appear when he had a strong motive to appear,
would be evidence against him. If he relies upon his abil-
ity to disprove the motive imputed, he takes the risk, but
he leaves the effect of his conduct, as a matter of evidence
for the opposite side, to go to the jury, who must weigh
both sides to determine the real motive."4
Kind of Evidence, Omission to Produce Which Disparages
The party may be possessed of documents, which he
fails to produce. Two defendants may, for example, have
a series of receipts from the plaintiff, which would proba-
bly show whether they assented to be called therein part-
ners. Their non-production of the receipts would be evi-
dence against the truth of their denial of a partnership.5
When A claims an absolute title under a deed to X, which
was in fact made to him as a trustee for the grantors, A's
failure to produce the deed or to explain its non-production
would justify an inference that the deed disclosed that X
was a mere trustee.6  It has been seen however,
that the disparaging effect of the non-pro-
duction of evidence, exists when the evidence
is that of living witnesses, witnesses, however "who pre-
sumably are best informed on the subject of investigation,
4Browvn v. Schock, 77 Pa. 471.
5Frick v. Barbour, 64 Pa. 120.
dChurch v. Church, 25 Pa. 278.
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especially if their relations with such party are not hostile
but friendly, and their bias, if any, would be in his (the
non-calling party's) favor."'
Proving Efforts to Secure Testimony
If failure to exhibit evidence may justify a suspicion
that it, if produced, would be hostile, the party against
whom this inference would operate, may show that he has
made all practicable efforts to secure it. In divorce pro-
ceedings by A against his wife, B, B was allowed to prove
that she had subpoenaed X as a witness, and had had an
attachment served on X.8
Failure to Give Evidence Not Usable
In Heffner's Estate,9 an unwarranted use was made
by the Orphans' Court of the failure to present evidence.
A widow claimed $1000 from the estate of her deceased
husband. No proof was given of the amount of money,
nor, whether there was a gift or a loan. Certain
conversations of the deceased and his son (now the admin-
istrator) are shown, concerning money of the wife. The
time of these conversations had some importance. The
Orphans' Court said, "the court takes it however, that if
they had not occurred during the latter years of deceased,
the interested witness (the son and administrator), and
if not he, surely his counsel, knew enough to fix the time
during the early years of said yearly payments." Reversing
Williams, J. says, "The reasoning seems to be substan-
tially this: The claimant alleges a loan of $1000, out of
her own money to her husband and demands it out of his
estate. The proof is indefinite and insufficient. It does
not show how much of her money came into his hands,
7Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Super. 525.
8Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379.
9134 Pa. 436.
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or when, or whether it was received as a gift or a loan;
but if he did not have at least $900, and did not receive it
as a loan, the known intelligence of his administrator and
the attorney for the estate would enable them to establish
a negative. Because they did not establish a negative, the
learned judge inferred or presumed the affirmative and
accordingly made the decree. The trouble with this
method is that it puts the burden of proof on the wrong
shoulders."
Non-production in Criminal Cases
The non-production of evidence by the defendant in
a criminal case may. justify an inference, that he feared
that if produced it would prove unfavorable. X was on
trial for the murder of his father-in-law by shooting. He
testified that the shooting was accidental. The only per-
sons present at the affair were the deceased, the prisoner,
and the wife of the latter. The commonwealth could not
employ the wife as a witness; the prisoner could. He
did not call her. It was legitimate for counsel and court to
advert to his omission to call her, and to argue that it was
explainable by his belief that she would have contradicted
him. "There is," says Dean, J. "under the circumstan-
ces, no legal presumption raised by the refusal to call a
competent witness: it is simply a fact for the consideration
of the jury, entitled to such weight as, in view of all the
circumstances of the particular case, it ought in their judg-
ment, to have."10  The omission of the commonwealth to
call a witness, when the state of the case suggests the
wisdom of calling, if his testimony were believed to be
favorable, may be considered as a fact favorable to the de-
fendant.11 But, the son of the defendant in a murder casi
need not be called by the prosecution to avert an inference
11Com v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153.
URike v. Coin., .102 Pa. 408.
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that his testimony will be unfavorable to the common-
wealth.
12
Tampering Not Usable
While evidence that a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution has attempted to corrupt a juror, or suborn evi-
dence, may be given to lessen the credit of his defense, it
cannot be employed to contradict the testimony of his wit-
nesses to his good character. -'
Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibs
The principle that the use of falsehood to promote a
claim or a defense, justifies the suspicion that other false-
hood has been used in promoting the claim or defense, even
when there is no specific proof that it has been, is allied to
the principle expressed in the saw, falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. From falseness in one thing, falseness in every-
thing, must, may, be inferred. A may make untrue state-
ments, mistakenly. He may have observed a fact imper-
fectly, or may incorrectly remember it. He has then, no
intention to deceive. It would manifestly be absurd to say
that one who was mistaken in one thing was mistaken in
every thing; men are mistaken in some things. None are
mistaken in all things.14 It is possible for a man inten-
tionally to deceive once, in respect to one thing. How
foolish it would be to affirm that he who has once lied, will
lie always, with regard to every thing. It is possible for
one purposely to lie in regard to a matter, without lying
in all the assertions he may make, or has made, concerning
1
2Com. v. Fry, 198 Pa. 379; 48 At'llan. 257. See 2 Pennsylvania
Crim. Law, 1011.
' 3Com. v. Brown, 23 Super. 470, 502.
14Com. v. Sutton, 51 Super. 191. It is, says Rice, P. J., a rule
of permission and not a mandatory one, to be laid down by the court
as binding the jury without regard to the corroborating circumstan-
ces. Blumenthal v. Green, 52 Super. 292.
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that matter. Yet, at times the instruction to juries ap-
pears of which that in Commonwealth v. Ieradi, 5 a mur-
der case, is a specimen. The trial court told the jury, if
they believe that one of the witnesses has sworn falsely,
"then such witness is not to be believed in any respect,
and you have to discard his testimony." In this instruc-
tion are two errors: (1) The inference of universal un-
trustworthiness is made derivable from false swearing. It
should depend on wilfully and corruptly swearing falsely;
(2) "The correct principle goes no farther than to say
that the jury may disregard the testimony, not that they
must disregard it."'(,
Criminal Cases
The falseness of any testimony leads, in criminal, as
well as civil cases, to suspicion of other testimony of the
same witness. The witness may be one for the defend-
ant,17 or one for the Commonwealth.' 8 It was proper to
say to the jury that if a witness for the Commonwealth
"perjured himself by wilfully and deliberately stating up-
on any material point that which he knows to be false
you would have good ground (not be under a duty) for re-
jecting all his story."'19
Burden of Proof
The testimony of a single witness, e. g., the plaintiff,
may be the sole support of the cause for which he testifies.
If it is self-contradictory, perhaps the court should refuse
to allow the jury to decide in favor of the party to whose
success the evidence is essential.
35216 Pa. 87.
'6Brown, J., 216 Pa. 87; Com. v. Sutton, 51 Super. 191; Blumen-
thal v. Green, 52 Super. 292.
"7Com. v. Ieradi, 216 P& 87.
I8 Com. v. Sutton, 51 Super. 191.
19Id. 51 Super. 191.
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In an action of trespass for personal injuries, arising
from the collision of a train with a buggy, which was at-
tempting to cross the track, the testimony of the plaintiff
concerning his own care was contradictory. Mitchell, J.
remarks that "Had it referred to a subject as to which the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff, the court could not
have submitted evidence which would merely enable a jury
to guess at a fact in favor of a party who was bound to
prove it.'"°2 The carefulness of the plaintiff was to be as-
sumed until it was disproved. The self-contradictory tes-
timony of the plaintiff did not disprove it. The contra-
diction may be, not between parts of the testimony of the
same witness but between the testimony of one witness,
e. g. the plaintiff, in a collision case, and that of another
witness called by him. If the party's testimony negatives
contributory negligence the jury must be allowed to de-
cide, although the testimony of his other witness clearly
shows such negligence, unless the number and weight of
his witness who contradict him make it impossible for
the court to support a verdict in his favor.21
Plevious Non-Judicial Assertions
The witness may have made statements, not in any
judicial proceeding, which are inconsistent with his present
assertions. A sues B, a bailee of goods, on B's guaranty
that they should be returned undamaged by water, fire, or
otherwise. B has had the goods insured, has made a written
claim on the insurance company, alleging damage, and has
received money therefrom. In A's suit on the guaranty,
B denies that the goods were damaged. He likewise testi-
fies to other matters. It is error for the court first, to
assume that the testimony as to the damage was wilful,
deliberate and corrupt perjury, and secondly, to direct that
for that reason, the testimony concerning other matters,
2 Ely v- Railway, 158 Pa. 233; Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. 626.
2-Kohler v. R. R. Co., 135 Pa. 346.
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could not be believed by the jury.22 Suit against a town-
ship for injuries by reason of a defective bridge. The
trial court properly refused to say that if the plaintiff had
stated to others, and had testified in a former case, that
she did not know how she was injured, she having at the
trial given a distinct account of the acci-
dent, "and that such statements and testi-
mony so made by her were true, then the
verdict must be for the defendants." McCollum, J., af-
firms the judgment, saying "If Mrs. Platz had in her for-
mer testimony or elsewhere, made statements contradictory
of her testimony on the second trial, such statements af-
fected her credibility as a witness, but they did not au-
thorize an instruction that 'the verdict must be for the
defendants.' ",23 Action by a minor for injuries. One
witness, X, testified for the plaintiff as to the manner
of the accident. T*o days after the accident, X had sub-
scribed a written account of it, drawn up by an employe
of the defendant, but not read to X, which was inconsistent
with his testimony in court. The trial court improperly
entered judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto,
because, in its opinion, the burden of proving the defend-
ant's negligence had not been discharged in view of the
discrepant testimony of the only witness.
2 4
22Blumenthal v. Green, 52 Super. 292. The trial court told the
jury that it was impossible that the defendant could have been guilty
of anything but deliberate, false and corrupt perjury, adding "A
person like that is unworthy of belief in any respect, no matter
what he says."
23Platz v. McKean Township, 178 Pa. 601. The justice ignores
the qualification in the point, "and that such statements and testi-
mony so made by her was true." He explains Mrs. Platz's testimony
by suggesting that in saying she did not know how she was injured,
she may have referred to the degree or extent of the injury.
24Danko v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 230 Pa. 295. Brown, J., suggests
that the trial court might have set aside the verdict, by awarding a
new trial, but it gave no opportunity to do this, but directed that
judgment be entered for the plaintiff upon the verdict.
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Previous Judicial Statements
The testimony at the trial may be inconsistent with
what has been given in a previous investigation. The in-
consistency is not a justification for refusing to allow the
jury to believe the present testimony. In a suit on a note,
the defendant denied the genuineness of hiz signature.
Notwithstanding his earlier testimony in a preceding in-
vestigation that it was genuine, the court properly refuses
to say that the verdict should be for the plaintiff.5 In a
trial of a suit for injury to a minor employe, he had testi-
fied that the duty to which he was assigned was to "put
wool on the apron" of a machine used for separating wool.
At the present trial he testifies that he was employed to
"remove the choke" without being properly instructed how
safely to do it. The court granted a non-suit, because he
disbelieved the present testimony of the plaintiff as to
what he was employed to do. Says Mestrezat, J., "If the
testimony of the plaintiff in the two trials was in conflict
it was not within the scope of the judge's duties to say
which was true and which was false. That duty rested
with the jury as is well settled by our own decisions.
' '20
Change of Allegations
In Wingrove v. Central Penna. Traction Co.,27 there is
in a second trial, a substitution of one support for a claim
for damages, for another. The plaintiff alleged injury
from the negligent starting of a car, while she was at-
tempting to get on. In the first trial her allegation was
that a rib had been fractured, and she called two physi-
cians to support it. In the second trial neither she nor her
witnesses said anything about a fractured rib. The testi-
mony of the two physicians at the first trial was offered
25Alexander v. Buckwalter, 17 Super. 128.
26Creachen v. Carpet Co., 209 Pa. 6.
27237 Pa. 549.
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in evidence, together with evidence that she was not suf-
fering from a fractured rib, "for the purpose of affecting
the credibility of her case, as presented on the second
trial." The evidence was properly excluded, Potter, J.
remarking that the credibility of the plaintiff cannot be
attacked in that way. "If admitted, it would not have
contradicted any testimony given on the second trial.
It would only have shown that upon the first trial the phy-
sicians testified to certain matters which were not men-
tioned at the second trial." Yet, the abrupt shifting of the
proofs of the nature of the injury, the abandonment of the
allegations at the first trial and of the witnesses relied up-
on to prove them, tended to awaken suspicion of the sound-
ness of the contention of the plaintiff.
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MOOT COURT
WHITBY v. HOLCOMB
Trespass--Liability for Injury to Neighboring Property-Lawful Use
of One's Own Land
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Action of trespass q. c. f. Court below awarded verdict for
plaintiff for $400. This is an appeal from the decision of the court
below. Holcomb was quarrying stone. The explosions of dynamite
used cast large and small pieces of rock upon Whitby's premises,
which were within 40 feet of the place where the quarrying was
done, and some of them broke windows, broke in the roof, and shat-
tered a door. Holcomb was not actuated by malice and he was not
negligent.
Smith, for the plaintiff.
Morford, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEAVER, J. "The dividing line between the right to use one's
ewn, and the duty not to injure another's is one of great nicety and
importance, and frequently of difficulty. The Pennsylvania decis-
ions have endeavored with unusual care to preserve the substance
of both rights, as far as their sometimes inevitable conflict will per-
mit." Per Mitchell, J., in Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131
Pa. 143. Thus in the present case we must decide whether it is bet-
ter that the plaintiff should have his home damaged and possibly
ultimately destroyed, without reparation, in order that the defendant
can develop his land, or that the defendant shall either pay for the
damage that his acts produce or stop using his land in such a mode.
Holcomb was quarrying the stone on his land. He was engaged
in a lawful act, developing the natural resources which he found
on his land, and the blasting was a necessary operation for such de-
velopment. He did his work carefully and did not wish to injure
anyone. With the facts as stated, could we not invoke the doctrine
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 128: "Damages re-
sulting to another from the natural and lawful use of his land by the
owner thereof are, in the absence of malice or negligence, damnum
absque injuria." Whether we consider the law as laid down in that
case as subservient of the best interests of the state or not, as it
is the law at the present time in this commonwealth, we will be
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obliged to follow it in determining the case at bar, unless there can
be shown some difference in the fundamental facts of the case, such
as would bring it from under the control of that case. In the San-
derson case the plaintiff by working its coal mine, caused a stream
that flowed through the defendant's land to become so polluted by
the acids from the coal that it caused material damage to the de-
fendant, who was the plaintiff in the first action. It was held that
if the Coal Co. could not pollute the waters of the stream with the
water from the mine, they would be forced to stop mining coal. The
court reasoned that since the mining of that product was the foremost
industry of the state, it was best that private interests should be
forfeited for the benefit of the great industry of the state. As a
result many streams through the state today are unfit for any other
purpose than that of carrying away the refuse and acidulatect waters
from the coal mines.
Is blasting of rock such an important industry of this state that
it should be preserved by forfeiting the rights of private land own-
ers? We think it is not. We think that the maxim, sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas, is applicable to this case. In Hauck v. Tide-
water Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, Paxton, C. J., who decided in
favor of the Coal Co. in the Sanderson case, says, "If the mere fact
that the business is a lawful business, and has been conducted with
care, would be a defense where a neighbor's land had been injured in
consequence of the business carried on there, the escape of gas for
instance, or the escape of oil, -the result would be that a man might
lose his farm, might be compelled to leave it. and have no compensa-
tion simply because the business which brought about this loss was a
lawful business, and was carried on carefully. That is not the law.
No man's property can be taken, directly or indirectly, without com-
pensation under the law of this state. Hence, there are cases, and
a great many of them, where a defendant is held liable in damages
although his business is lawful, and he has exercised care in carry-
ing it on."
"In consideration of this class of cases, care must be taken to
distinguish between the natural and necessary development of the
land itself, and injuries resulting from the character of some busi-
ness, not incident and necessary to the development of the land, or
the minerals and other substances lying within it." In the present
case even if the quarrying of the stone is a natural use, it is an un-
necessary use, as the land can profitably be used in other ways with-
out destroying surrounding property.
In Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa, 143, we find the
following: "The principle of Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson is pre-
cisely the same as that of Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, and is
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one of general application. It is, that the use which inflicts the
damages must be natural, proper, and free from negligence and
damage unavoidable. In the Sanderson case the damage was un-
avoidable. In Wheatley v. Baugh it was not ascertainable before-
hand, hence the plaintiff had no cause of action in either case. If the
plaintiff showed that the injury was plainly to be anticipated, and
easily to be prevented with reasonable care and expense, he brought
himself within the exception of all the cases from Wheatley v. Baugh
to the Sanderson case."
Altho I have found no cases reported in the higher courts of
this state that are directly in point, there are two cases in the lower
courts that throw some light on the subject. In Sayen v. Johnson
and Bro., 4 Pa. C. C. 360, it was held that an injunction will issue
to restrain a defendant from so operating a stone quarry by blast-
ing that pieces of rock are constantly thrown into the public
zoad and upon the premises of the plaintiff, to the great danger of
the plaintiff and his family. In Frazier v. Pennypack Trap Rock
Co., 17 Montg. Co. 105, it was held that blasting in a stone quarry,
which, when conducted without negligence, casts stones which are
dangerous to life and limb upon the public highway and upon the
buildings and premises of adjoining property owners, will be re-
strained even though such restraint will make it impossible to work
the quarry at a profit.
Since there are no cases directly on this point in the higher
courts of this state, it would be well to consider how such
cases have been decided in other jurisdictions. In Colton v. Onder-
donk, 69 Cal. 155, it was said, "The fact that the defendant used
quantities of gunpowder, a violent and dangerous explosive, to blast
out rocks upon his own lot continguous to another person's, situate
in a large city, must be taken as an unreasonable, unusual and un-
natural use of his own property, which no care or skill in so doing
can excuse him from being responsible to the plaintiff for the dam-
ages he actually did to her dwelling house, as the natural and prox-
imate result of his blasting, for an act which in many cases is in it-
self lawful becomes unlawful when by it damage has occurred to
the property of another; and it would make no material difference
whether that damage, resulting proximately and naturally from the
act of blasting by the defendant, was caused by rocks thrown against
plaintiff's dwelling house, or by concussion of air around it, which
had either damaged or entirely destroyed it."
M~Tr. Thompson, in his commentary on the Law of Negligence,
(vol. 1, sec. 764), says decisions can be collected responding to three
propositions: (1) If by an explosion dirt or stones are thrown upon
the property of the adjoining owner, injuring such property, such
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owner may recover damages irrespective of the question of negli-
gence, since this is a trespass upon his property; (2) where the
work of blasting is done in a situation where it is necessarily dan-
gerous to the public, as in a thickly settled portion of a city, dam-
ages are recoverable without proof of negligence, for the reason that
in such case the work itself is so inherently dangerous that the
doing of it, no matter how carefully, is of itself negligence; (3)
liability will attacD to the person carrying on the dangerous work
where the work has been negligently done.
In Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N. Y. 169, it was held that one who by
blasting done upon his own land, casts debris directly upon the
land of another is liable in trespass irrespective of his motive, and
that in such case his carefulness or negligence is immaterial. The
language used by Gardiner, J., is very general: "The means by which
it (the defendant's admittedly lawful and proper improvement of his
property) was prosecuted are illegal notwithstanding. For they dis-
turbed the rightful possession of the plaintiff and caused a direct
and immediate injury to his property." Bay v. Scott, 3 Md. 431.
As this court considers this a just and equitable doctrine, uni-
versally acknowledged, we see no reason for not applying it in this
state to the present case.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The able opinion of the learned court below, makes a lengthy
discussion by us unnecessary. A similar conclusion was reached on
similar facts, in Mulchanock v. Mitchell Cement Manuf. Co., 253 Pa.
262. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
